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In the Preface to Realism. A critique of Brentano and Meinong (Bergmann, 
1967), Gustav Bergmann (1906–1987) stated that that was «the sort of book a 
man writes only once in his life» (p. VII). In fact, Realism is a formidable work, 
which combines different purposes. The first half of the book mainly consists 
in a presentation of Bergmann’s mature views, as they have developed through 
the years, from the strictly positivistic beginnings, in the footsteps of Carnap 
and the Vienna Circle, to the rich ontology of the 60s1. Bergmann’s aim is that 
of firmly establishing a realistic view, in two different senses of the word 
‘realism’: realism1, the view according to which universals exist (in opposition 
to nominalism); and realism2, the view according to which – roughly speaking – 
the “world” is independent of minds (in opposition to idealism). It is 
Bergmann’s considered view that a failure to secure a solidly realistic1 ontology 
almost inevitably leads to some form of idealism (Bonino, 2009). The book can 
also be read as a sustained criticism of three main stumbling blocks on the way 
to realism2: nominalism, reism, and representationalism. Nominalism is of 
course the view according to which there are no universals. Reism can be 
preliminary characterized as the view according to which all entitites are things 
(in a sense of ‘thing’ that will be specified later). Representationalism is the 
view that there are intermediaries of some sort between mental entities 
(subjects, minds, or whatever) and their intentions; such intermediaries 
(typical examples of which are the ideas of the empiricist tradition) inhabit what 
Bergmann calls the Third (world), whereas the First is the properly mental 
world and the Second is the physical one (the so-called “external world”). 
 
† Dipartimento di Filosofia e Scienze dell’educazione, Università di Torino, Italy. 
1 For two brief presentations of Bergmann’s philosophy, cf. (Addis, 1971), (Tegtmeier, 1999). For 
broader examinations of his work, cf. (Hochberg, 2001), (Bonino & Torrengo, 2004), (Bonino, 
2009). 
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Realism2 can thus be reformulated as the view that the Second is independent 
of the First. The Third, according to Bergmann, does not exist, and its 
introduction almost inevitably leads – through more or less tortuous routes – 
to idealism. One of the main aims of Realism is to expose such tortuous routes. 
And that also accounts for the second half of the book, in which the 
philosophies of two significant members of the representationalist tradition are 
analysed and criticized: the philosophies of Brentano and Meinong. Brentano 
and Meinong are not typical exponents of unreconstructed 
representationalism. In fact, their views are very sophisticated, and both of 
them, at least in their intentions, aim at overcoming representationalism in 
order to attain a realistic2 position. Yet it is Bergmann’s contention that both of 
them fail, though in different ways and for different reasons. And also the 
degree of their failure is different. Whereas Brentano ended up for Bergmann 
in overt idealism, Meinong came very close to success. That is why Bergmann’s 
whole book is dedicated “to the glorious memory of Alexius Meinong”. 
It must be made clear from the beginning that Bergmann’s examination of 
Meinong’s philosophy – as happens with all his analyses of other philosophers 
– does not belong to what Bergmann calls “factual history”, but rather to 
“structural history”, that is something very close to what is usually known as 
“rational reconstruction”. Such a reconstruction is conducted by means of a 
constant comparison with the “foil”, which is a schematized version of 
Bergmann’s own ontological views. That makes the whole undertaking a rather 
complicated matter, in which one must always “translate” from Bergmann’s 
notions to Meinong’s ones and vice versa. This is one of the reasons that makes 
Bergmann’s interpretation of Meinong’s philosophy somewhat 
“violent”(Raspa, 2008, pp. 202–204); another reason is the highly selective 
character of Bergmann’s reading of Meinong, which deliberately focuses 
mainly on the problems and issues that are interesting from Bergmann’s point 
of view. Now, in order to understand at least something of Bergmann’s 
analysis, a brief sketch of the foil is required. 
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(A) things   (1) particulars 
    (2) universals      (i) properties 
                   (ii) relations 
(B) facts 
(C) subsistents   (3) nexus 
    (4) other kinds of subsistents 
 
Roughly, the subsistents are the referents of the logical constants of the ideal 
language2, with the addition of some other kindred entities. Intuitively, they 
are responsible for what Wittgenstein would have called the “form” or the 
“structure” of the world. By contrast, things correspond to its “content” (they 
are the referents of the descriptive constants of the ideal language). The 
category of things is further divided into two subcategories, that of particulars 
(referred to by individual constants), and that of universals (referred to by 
predicates). Particulars are to be understood as mere particulars, i.e., as devoid 
of any nature. All things are simple entities. Unlike things, facts are complex 
entities. Their complexity consists in their having constituents, which are “in” 
facts; such constituents are particulars and universals. Yet also subsistents are 
involved in facts. With reference to facts, the most significant subsistent is the 
nexus of exemplification, which ties together the particular(s) and the universal 
that make up the fact. Nexus are in fact those subsistents that “connect” other 
entities into more complex ones. Exemplification does not need a further 
nexus to tie it to what it ties, otherwise an endless regress would arise, as 
Bradley has showed. Here lies an important difference between things and 
subsistents, a difference which has to do with the “dependence” or 
“independence” of these entities. There is a sense in which facts may be 
regarded as independent, whereas things must be regarded as dependent. Such 
a dependence of things is spelled out by the principle of exemplification, 
according to which no universal that is not exemplified by at least one 
particular exists, as well as no particular that does not exemplify at least one 
universal exists. Bergmann claims that in this sense both particulars and 
universals are dependent2, whereas facts are independent2. But while they are 
dependent2, there is also a sense in which things are independent. A particular, 
for instance, must indeed exemplify a universal, but it must not exemplify a 
 
2 It is here impossible to explain Bergmann’s “ideal language method”. For a thorough presentation 
cf. (Bonino, 2009), chap. II. 
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certain specific one: the mere presence of a particular and the universal red 
does not make up the fact that that particular is red. In order for some things to 
make up a fact, a connection is required, and such a connection is provided for 
Bergmann by a subsistent, i.e, the nexus of exemplification. This nexus, being 
a subsistent, does not need another connection in order to be connected to the 
other constituents of the fact, otherwise it would not be a subsistent but rather 
a thing, and an endless regress would arise. In this sense things may be said to 
be independent1, whereas subsistents are dependent1. It must also be noticed 
that ordinary objects, such as chairs, are not to be conceived of as things in the 
foil, but rather as facts, or as conjunctions of facts. To take a simpler example, a 
red round spot might presumably be analysed as a particular exemplifying two 
universals, i.e., redness and roundness, and therefore as a fact or a conjunction 
of facts. 
Coming to Meinong, Bergmann’s general assessment of his philosophy 
with respect to the three errors of nominalism, reism and representationalism 
is worth quoting at length: 
Meinong’s nominalism, though as refined as it could possibly be, is extreme. In 
one of the struggles he thus remained in the rear. His reism, curiously and 
characteristically mitigated as it is, stretched to the utmost, as it were, does yet 
not stretch far enough. He remained a reist of a very special kind. That kept 
him out of the front ranks of another struggle. In the third, however, against 
representationalism, he led, and, had he also been in the forefront of the other 
two, might have conquered, might have arrived at an ontology not only 
realistic2 and no longer representationalist but also adequate in all other 
respects. The one at which he did arrive is not. Yet, at the price of much 
bizarreness, he came agonizingly close. That makes him the most memorable 
Don Quixote of a great cause (Bergmann, 1967, p. 340). 
Bergmann’s detailed and painstaking analyses of Meinong’s philosophy do not 
lend themselves to easy summarizing. What perhaps can be usefully done here 
is giving a sort of reasoned explanation of these curt pronouncements, with 
some more in-depth probings concerning few selected questions.  
Let us start with representationalism, whose virtual overcoming is 
according to Bergmann the major reason for Meinong’s glory3. Though 
originally belonging to the representationalist tradition, his craving for 
realism2 led Meinong, in his mature philosophy, to free himself almost 
 
3 On Meinong and representationalism according to Bergmann cf. (Egidi, 2005). 
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completely of the shackles of representationalism. His ontology does not 
contain a Third: there are no intermediaries between the mental acts (which are 
in the First) and their intentions (which are in the Second). Mental acts, or 
better, their cores, i.e., their contents (which are simple entities) are directly 
connected with their intentions. That is exactly the same analysis proposed by 
Bergmann, who therefore cannot but recognize that – structurally at least – 
Meinong has genuinely attained a realistic2 position. Yet such an attainment is 
marred by several troubles.4 
These troubles are mainly due to Meinong’s nominalism and reism. As to 
the former, Bergmann claims that Meinong remained a strict nominalist 
throughout the whole of his career. That means that he did not admit either 
universals or bare particulars; both are replaced by what Bergmann calls 
perfect particulars (in more usual terminology, tropes), i.e., particularized 
properties and relations. Bergmann held that nominalism is in itself 
inadequate, but that is just an extrinsic criticism. What is worse is that 
nominalism fosters reism. For a realist1 like Bergmann an ordinary object is to 
be analysed as a fact, i.e., the exemplification of universals by particulars. For a 
nominalist it is rather analysed as a bundle of perfect particulars. Let us take a 
red round spot. According to Bergmann’s view, it must be assayed as ‘ν1 (a, A1, 
A2)’, where ‘a’ stands for the particular that individuates the spot, ‘A1’ for the 
universal red, ‘A2’ for the universal round, ‘ν1’ for the nexus of exemplification. 
The nominalist scheme for the same spot is ‘ν2 (a1, a2)’, where ‘a1’ stands for 
the perfect particular grounding the redness of the spot, ‘a2’ for the perfect 
particular grounding its roundness, and ‘ν2’ for a nexus different from ν1 in 
that it connects entities belonging to the same ontological category. Now let us 
put ourselves in the situation of someone who has not yet decided about the 
ontological category to which the entities referred to by ‘ν1 (a, A1, A2)’ and ‘ν2 
(a1, a2)’ belong. The advocate of the first assay acknowledges – up to this 
moment – subsistents, bare particulars and universals; the advocate of the 
second assay acknowledges subsistents and perfect particulars. Neither of 
them is likely to regard the new entity as a subsistent. The former can 
 
4 In Bergmann’s view, Meinong’s overcoming of representationalism should be considered all the 
more praiseworthy when taking into account his strict nominalism. Representationalism, indeed, 
arose – among other things – also as a means to solve some of the problems posed by nominalism; 
more specifically, to find some substitutes for universals: ideas, according to Bergmann, are nothing 
but “universals in exile from reality” (Bergmann, 1967, p. 135). On the other hand, Meinong’s 
nominalism and reism are the sources of what Bergmann regards as the radical inadequacies of his 
philosophy. 
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contemplate the possibility of considering the new entity either as a bare 
particular or as a universal, but both alternatives seem unattractive. In fact the 
new entity neither seems to be “bare”, nor can plausibly be regarded as a 
universal which has a particular “within” itself. Thus he is almost forced to 
recognize a new category, i.e., that of facts. By constrast, the nominalist may 
easily be tempted to regard the new entity as belonging to the same category of 
the perfect particulars; in that case the only difference between a1 and a2 on the 
one hand and the new entity on the other would be that the former are 
“simple”, the latter “complex”. In this case the distinction between things and 
facts collapses. Yet, in a sense, in the philosophical tradition the entities 
envisaged in such a world have usually been considered more nearly like things 
than like facts. But now a new temptation arises to simplify the schema further, 
by dropping also the nexus (subsistents), which – by the way – fully make sense 
only in a world in which there are both things and facts. Now we are in a 
position to characterize reism more exactly, as that view according to which: (i) 
there are no facts; (ii) all entities are things, either simple or “complex”5; (iii) 
subsistents are ignored or at least downplayed. 
And this is, according to Bergmann, Meinong’s view. Now, charging 
Meinong with reism may seem quite odd, if one considers that one of the 
reasons for which Meinong is famous is his acknowledgment of Objektive, and 
that Objektive, in so far as they can subsist or not subsist, seem to side with the 
sort of entities that are usually called ‘facts’, or ‘states of affairs’, which have 
such a “twofold” nature, rather than with things. One can just think of 
Wittgenstein’s distinction, in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, between 
objects on the one hand and facts and states of affairs on the other6; a 
distinction that is reflected, on a linguistic level, by the difference between 
names (which are like points) and sentences (which are like arrows, i.e., 
twofold, or bipolar). Yet Bergmann tries to prove that Objektive cannot be 
regarded as genuinely complex in the sense in which his own facts are complex. 
But Objektive are not the only kind of entities which, in Meinong’s ontology, 
may be somehow made to correspond to Bergmann’s facts: in addition to them 
there are also Komplexe. In fact Meinong explicitly identifies ordinary objects 
not with Objektive, but rather with Komplexe. Therefore, if he wants to show 
 
5 The double quotation marks indicate that, from Bergmann’s point of view, this is not genuine 
complexity, which can only be attributed to facts, but just an illusion thereof. 
6 We can here disregard the further difference between facts (Tatsachen) and states of affairs 
(Sachverhalte). It will be disregarded in what follows as well. 
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that in Meinong’s ontology there are no entities that are complex in the sense 
in which his facts are, Bergmann must address the case of Komplexe as well. 
Thus Bergmann offers a “proof” that Meinong’s Objektive are really things 
(not facts). In order to do so, he must independently prove that they are (i) 
particular (so that they cannot be categorized as universals), (ii) independent1 
(so that they cannot be categorized as subsistents), and (iii) simple (so that they 
cannot be categorized as facts). The proof, which concerns not only Objektive, 
but also another kind of Meinong’s Gegenstände höherer Ordnung, i.e., 
Relationen, is long and tangled, and cannot be examined here in any detail7.  
What is most relevant is Bergmann’s interpretation – which is a result of his 
proof – of the way in which Relationen and Objektive, as Gegenstände höherer 
Ordnung, are related to their foundations. According to Bergmann, Relationen 
and Objektive must not be thought of as complexes made up of their 
foundations (in the way in which in the foil facts are made up of their 
constituents); rather, they should be conceived of as the values of functions, of 
which the foundations are the arguments. Contrary to what happens with a fact 
and its constituents, the value of a function is not a complex entity made up of 
its arguments (i.e., it is not really a fact); rather it is a (simple) thing 
coordinated with them. In other words, Meinong’s ontology – at least with 
respect to objects of higher order – is not a complex ontology, like 
Bergmann’s, but a function ontology, though Meinong himself does not seem 
to be aware of that. 
As to Komplexe, Bergmann does away with them by stating that they are 
literally nothing. According to his reconstruction, a Komplex is simply the 
collection of the things which in the foil would play the roles of the constituents 
of a fact; but – as Bradley showed – a collection of constituents is not a fact, 
since it lacks the required unity. Meinong is awake to the problem, and to face 
it he introduces a further constituent, under the guise of a reale Relation, 
which is supposed to provide such a unity; but since he does not recognize the 
category of subsistents (nexus), the further constituent is just another thing, 
which, in order to be connected with the other constituents would need 
another connection. Therefore we are left once again with a mere collection, 
which is nothing in addition to its constituents (and a fortiori it is not a genuine 
fact). 
 
7 See (Bonino, 2006) for a more accurate examination. 
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Therefore, if one accepts Bergmann’s interpretation, neither Objektive nor 
Komplexe can be regarded as facts; the latter are just a delusion, the former are 
really things. It is thus clear in what sense Bergmann can accuse Meinong of 
reism. But it is also clear that Meinong’s reism is extraordinarily sophisticated 
or, as Bergmann says, «stretched to the utmost». In fact Meinong recognized 
the need for connections (Relationen) and for complexes (Objektive), even if 
he did not know how to satisfy this need in an effective way. The same can be 
seen in connection with the notion of Komplex: even if the gambit based on the 
addition of a constituent cannot work, at least Meinong clearly acknowleged 
the need to secure unity to the collection. 
From an exegetical point of view, many objections could be raised against 
Bergmann’s interpretation. Concerning Objektive, the first remark to be made 
is that Bergmann’s “proof” that they are (simple) things is not really a proof, 
but just – as Bergmann says – a “structural” one, i.e., the gathering together of 
different evidences that collectively should convince the reader that the 
interpretation put forth is the most natural one. Another criticism is based on 
Bergmann’s propensity to conceive of Objektive only on the basis of Meinong 
(1899), thus putting them on a par with Relationen, although different views 
are put forward in Meinong’s works (Cf. Raspa, 2008; Sierszulska, 2005). As 
to the accuracy of Bergmann’s analysis of the notion of Komplex, even more 
objections can be raised8. Some doubts are also legitimate with reference to 
Meinong’s alleged nominalism. (Raspa, 2008), for instance, points out that in 
later works, ignored by Bergmann, Meinong seems to establish a clear and 
unequivocal notion of universal. 
Leaving the question of exegetical accuracy on one side, it seems to me that 
Bergmann’s assessment of Meinong’s purported reism (which is probably the 
most original feature of his interpretation) calls to our attention at least two 
interesting points, one concerning Meinong, one concerning Bergmann 
himself. As to the former, Bergmann warns us against too easy an identification 
of Objektive with facts or states of affairs. We have already remarked that, with 
reference to the distinction between objects on the one hand, and facts and 
states of affairs on the other, a distinction whose locus classicus is 
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, Meinong’s Objektive seem to side with facts. Yet it is 
exactly by reference to the distinction of the Tractatus that one can appreciate 
how the notion of fact or state of affairs, meant as a complex entity, which – just 
 
8 (Raspa, 2008, pp. 223-225). On the notion of Komplex cf. also (Tegtmeier, 2000). 
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in so far as it is complex – can subsist or not subsist, takes on its full meaning in 
opposition to objects; the latter, being simple, do not possess such twofold 
nature. But in Meinong the twofold nature is not limited to Objektive; it 
applies to Objekte as well, which can exist and not exist, and that should raise 
some suspicions as to the genuine correspondence between Objektive and 
facts. 
The point concerning Bergmann is suggested by the pair of notions 
Objektiv-Komplex, at least as interpreted by Bergmann himself. In fact the pair 
seems to point to a tension in Bergmann’s own ontology. It is part and parcel of 
the conception of complex ontology that complexes (facts) be different from 
the collection of their constituents (as Bradley insisted); that result would no 
doubts be attained in a function ontology, in which the value of a function is 
certainly different from its arguments; and this seems to be the aspect of 
complexes that is made manifest by Objektive. But on the other hand, 
complexes must also be made up of their constituents (they are not just another 
thing), or – as Bergmann also says – the constituents are “in” the complexes. 
Of course this aspect of complexes is not taken care of by Objektive (that is 
indeed Bergmann’s criticism of that notion), but rather by Komplexe; or 
better, that is the aspect of which Komplexe should take care, if they did not fail 
because of the lack of nexus in Meinong’s ontology. It is as if Bergmann wanted 
to identify Objektive and Komplexe as the two poles of his own notion of 
complexes (facts). It is doubtful whether the different demands of the two poles 
can be accommodated by a single notion (it is, of course, the old problem of the 
unity of complexes): it is not difficult to find traces of a certain uneasiness 
about the whole question in Bergmann’s writings, and probably it is not by 
chance that few years after Realism Bergmann developed a new ontology, 
which addresses these problems in a completely different way (Bergmann, 
1992). 
On the whole, it is somewhat strange that Bergmann’s interpretation of 
Meinong’s philosophy did not produce a great impact on Meinongian studies, 
although it took part in the general rediscovery of Meinong during the 60s of 
the 20th century. There are some trivial reasons for that, first of all the 
proverbial difficulty of Bergmann’s works – to which his analysis of Meinong 
makes no exception –, mainly due to a highly idiosyncratic terminology. But 
there are certainly deeper reasons as well. (Raspa, 2008) suggests that 
Bergmann’s interpretation failed to get in touch with the main motivations 
underlying the increasing interest for Meinong’s philosophy, and thus ended 
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up being excluded from the mainstream. In particular, Bergmann is hostile to 
Meinong’s notion of Daseinsfreiheit, which is central to the contemporary 
debate on Meinongian issues. But all that can be accounted for by the 
consideration already made that Bergmann was not really interested in 
Meinong’s philosophy per se, and in its themes and concerns. Rather, he 
sought in Meinong the opportunity to raise his own philosophical agenda, 
which was and still is, alas, distant from the mainstream. 
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